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 NOTE 
Arbitration Whack-A-Mole:  The 
Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration 
Hammers the Rights of Individual 
Employees 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Sally and Billy are two recent college graduates entering the work force.  Sal-
ly is hired by ABC Corporation.  As part of Sally’s new hire paperwork, she signs 
an employment agreement stating any employment disputes would be resolved 
through arbitration.  Billy is hired by XYZ Company, a union shop, where his 
employment is governed by the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that Un-
ion and XYZ have executed.  The CBA states any disputes arising out of the CBA 
are to be resolved through arbitration.  Both the employment agreement and the 
CBA’s arbitration provision language are ambiguous as to whether the duty to 
arbitrate applies after the agreements expire and whether the right to a jury trial is 
waived.  Both are also silent as to whether class arbitration is permitted.  In due 
time, the employment contract and the CBA expire.  Now Sally claims her em-
ployer violated a statutory fundamental right.  The question remains whether her 
duty to arbitrate that claim continues.  Based on recent cases, both Sally and Billy 
have a continuing obligation to arbitrate, and the agreements would be found to 
have post-expiration effect.  Where the union would arbitrate the grievance on 
Billy’s behalf giving his claim class-like effect, Sally is left without the advantage 
of a class-wide action against her employer. 
In a country that protects the plaintiff’s right to a day in court, it only seems 
natural that Sally should have the opportunity to take her cause to the courthouse.  
But the strong federal presumption that supports the enforcement of arbitration 
provisions is like a hammer that pushes plaintiffs like Sally and those in Huffman 
into the arbitration arena.  In Huffman, the Sixth Circuit rescued an employer from 
an ambiguous arbitration provision contained in the employer-drafted employment 
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agreement and enforced the arbitration provision as one of the provisions to sur-
vive expiration of the contract, even though it was not listed in the survival clause. 
While in the context of a bargained-for contract between a union and an em-
ployer, enforcing arbitration provisions is reasonable for plaintiffs like Billy be-
cause he knows that he has additional protection because of his union member-
ship.  Sally knew that she voluntarily signed the employment agreement just like 
the Huffman plaintiffs did.  But questions remain in the individual employment 
context:  how “bargained-for” is a contract drafted by an employer, and how 
knowledgeable and voluntary is that employee’s agreement?  If Sally’s results 
seem perplexing and at odds with the protections that individual employees should 
have, read on. 
II.  FACTS & HOLDING 
Patricia Huffman, Joseph Passerino, George Pruden, Janet Carrigan, and Rus-
sell Smith (Plaintiffs) were employees of The Hilltop Companies (Hilltop)
1
 an 
accounting, tax, and consulting firm focused in the banking, real estate, and gov-
ernment finance industries.
2
  Hilltop hired Plaintiffs to review mortgage files from 
PNC Bank.
3
  Each Plaintiff signed an employment agreement with Hilltop.
4
  From 
October 2011 through January 2013, Plaintiffs were contracted to review mort-
gage loans and regularly worked more than forty hours per week.
5
  Yet, they were 
not paid extra for working overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
6
 
because Hilltop classified them as independent contractors.
7
  Asserting their clas-
sification was in error, Plaintiffs filed a FLSA class action claim for overtime 
wages against Hilltop in the federal district court for Southern District of Ohio.
8
 
The relationship between Plaintiffs and Hilltop was governed by employment 
agreements, which contained both an arbitration clause and a survival clause.
9
  
The arbitration clause stated “any claim arising out of or relating to” the contract 
would be resolved by binding arbitration.
10
  In response to Plaintiff’s claim, 
Hilltop filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration.
11
 
However, the agreement’s survival clause12 specifically enumerated twelve 
clauses, none of which included or referenced the arbitration clause.
13
  Plaintiffs 
                                                          
 1. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC, 747 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 2. Our Company, HILLTOP COMPANIES, http://thehilltopcompanies.com/our-company/ (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2015). 
 3. Huffman, 747 F.3d at 393. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 is codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2014).  The maximum 
number of work hours and the requirement for any time over forty hours per week are to be paid at one 
and one-half times the regular rate of pay is outlined in 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2014). 
 7. Huffman, 747 F.3d at 393. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. The Survival clause stated:  “22. SURVIVAL. Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, and 
22 shall survive the expiration or earlier termination of this Agreement.”  Id. at 394. 
 13. Id.  Survival clauses are used in contracts when the parties want specific provisions of the con-
tract to continue to remain in effect after the expiration of the contract.  See, e.g., Survival Clause, 
TRANSLEGAL.COM, http://www.translegal.com/legal-english-dictionary/survival-clause (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2015). 
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cited the doctrine of expressio unius and claimed the arbitration clause was ex-
cluded from the survival clause, did not survive the expiration of the agreement, 
and was not binding.
14
 
While the Southern Ohio District Court acknowledged that when contract 
language is ambiguous the federal preference favors arbitration, the court found 
the arbitration clause was not enumerated in the survival clause; therefore, the 
parties had no duty to arbitrate.
15
  Hilltop’s motion to dismiss was denied, and 
Plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with their claim in federal court.
16
  Hilltop filed 
for a stay pending appeal of the district court’s denial to the Sixth Circuit, and the 
district court granted the motion.
17
 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Hilltop argued the district court erred when it 
held the arbitration provision did not survive the expiration of the contract.
18
  
Hilltop further argued the Plaintiffs were prohibited from arbitrating as a class 
because the arbitration clause did not expressly authorize class arbitration.
19
  Dis-
agreeing with the trial court, the Sixth Circuit held that when ambiguity comes 
from a broadly worded arbitration provision, it should be enforced because of the 
strong federal presumption in favor of arbitration.
20
  The court further held the 
arbitration provision had post expiration effect because the survival provision 
contract “did not clearly imply” otherwise.21  Finally, the court held that the arbi-
tration clause did not allow for class arbitration because the clause was silent re-




III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
To understand the impact of the Huffman decision is to understand how the 
law has developed to bring employees to such a point.  First, this section begins 
with a brief analysis of the traditional common law that applies to contracts, statu-
tory law applicable to arbitration provisions, and the enforceability of arbitration 
provisions in expired contracts.  Then this section explores the widespread federal 
policy favoring arbitration as it relates to the instant case.  Next, this section high-
lights the different legal atmospheres surrounding CBAs and individual employ-
ment contracts.  Finally this section concludes with an examination of how the 
right to a jury trial can be waived, and when class arbitration is permitted. 
                                                          
 14. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., No. 1:13-CV-00219, 2013 WL 3944478 (S.D. Ohio July 31, 2013). 
 15. Id. at *1. 
 16. Id. at *2. 
 17. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., No. 1:13-CV-00219, 2014 WL 695844, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 
2014). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Brief for Appellant, Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391 (2014) (No. 13-3938) 2013 WL 
5593234, at *21-30. 
 20. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 396-96 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 21. Id. at 398. 
 22. Id. 
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A.  Common Law Principles 
Contract provisions can be expressed in words or implied-in-fact.
23
  An im-
plied-in-fact contract provision is one that is not expressed in the words, but the 
terms are to be inferred from the specific situation and behavior of the parties.
24
  
For example, an implied-in-fact contract can be found when an express contract 




Rules of construction apply when the contract at issue is ambiguous.
26
  One 
canon of common law contract interpretation is contra proferentem,
27
 meaning 
contract ambiguities should be interpreted against the drafter.
28
  Another key tenet 
of contract interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio alterius,
29
 meaning if a 
contract provision explicitly lists some items, it excludes all others not listed. 
Contracts become ambiguous when their language has more than one mean-
ing.
30
  Ambiguities often arise when the parties are of unequal bargaining power
31
 
because what is unambiguous to a sophisticated party may be ambiguous to an 
unsophisticated party.
32
  Employers and unions are generally thought of as sophis-
ticated parties;
33
 conversely, employees are not ordinarily considered sophisticated 
parties.
34
  The fundamental difference between arbitration in the union/employer 
context and the individual employee context is an argument for enforcing the con-
tract made in these situations differently.
35
  Employers and unions negotiate and 
eventually agree to the terms of a collective agreement, making the arbitration 
provision it contains voluntary.
36
  Because both parties are involved in the bar-
gaining process, unions and employers agree to the collective bargaining process 
and the resulting terms willingly and voluntarily, reducing the risks by building in 
fairness.
37
  On the other hand, when employers draft employment agreements that 
                                                          
 23. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 12 (2014) (contract can also be constructive, which is not a subject 
matter of this note). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.19 (rev. ed. 1993) (continued performance after the expiration 
of an agreement permits courts to infer parties intended to renew the contract for the same terms). 
 26. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 329 (2014). 
 27. Latin for “against the offeror.”  Contra proferentem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2011). 
 28. Hauf v. Life Extension Found., 454 Fed. Appx. 425, 431 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 29. Thomas v. Nicholson, 423 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Latin for the “expression of 
one thing is the exclusion of another”). 
 30. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 331 (2014). 
 31. Omega Healthcare Inv’rs, Inc. v. Lantis Enters., 256 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 32. 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 331 (2014). 
 33. See, e.g., B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 636 A.2d 1016, 1023 (Ct. App. Md. 1994); Citizens Gas & 
Coke Util. v. Local Union No. 1400, IBEW, 874 N.E.2d 391, 402 n.5 (Ct. App. Ind. 2007). 
 34. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 88 n.10 (3d Cir. 2003).  But see B. Frank Joy Co., 
636 A.2d at 1023 (finding that employees can still be considered sophisticated parties when represent-
ed by an attorney). 
 35. Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 
BERKELEY J.  EMP.  & LAB.  L. 5, 8 (2014). 
 36. Id. (Comsti uses the term “voluntary arbitration” to refer to the employer and a union agreement 
to arbitrate, and the term “forced arbitration” to refer to arbitration provisions contained in employer-
drafted agreements).  While technically, all arbitration is voluntary, for the purposes of this note, 
arbitration between an employer and a union is referred to as “voluntary union arbitration,” whereas 
the provisions contained in employer-drafted employment agreement will be referred to as “employer-
drafted arbitration.” 
 37. Id. 
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contain arbitration provisions as a condition of employment with no meaningful 
bargaining,
38
 the arbitration might be viewed as forced.
39
  An employer-drafted 
arbitration clause is almost always found in employment contracts.
40
 
B.  Statutory Law Applicable to Contract Arbitration Provisions 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is the foundation of arbitration law in the 
United States.
41
  When a contract contains a written arbitration provision, the FAA 
requires enforcement of the agreement.
42
  Years of Supreme Court interpretation 
of the FAA uphold the validity of employment adhesion contracts if the substan-
tive provisions are fair.
43
  When parties have a grievance, the duty to arbitrate is 
created by their contract.
44
  In other words, there is a presumption in favor of arbi-
trating a dispute when a contract contains an arbitration clause.
45
 
Originally, the FAA was intended to apply only to the voluntary arbitration 
context.
46
  Yet the Supreme Court has routinely applied the FAA to situations 
involving individuals.
47
  In Circuit City v. Adams,
48
 the Supreme Court deter-
mined the FAA applied to individual employment contracts.
49
  The FAA limits 
courts’ power to review arbitration agreements.50  To be within the court’s power, 
the contract must be facially valid and the disputed issue must fall within the 
scope of the contract.
51
 
An arbitration provision is understood to remain in effect after the expiration 
of the contract
52
 unless the contract expressly or clearly indicates otherwise.
53
  
Parties can expressly or clearly indicate their preference by using plain language 
                                                          
 38. Under Ohio law, when there is a lack of meaningful choice “combined with contract terms that 
are unreasonably favorable to the other party” the contract is deemed unconscionable.  Jones v. U-Haul 
Co. of Mass. & Ohio, 16 F. Supp. 3d 922, 935 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 39. Comsti, supra note 35, at 8. 
 40. Id.  Employment contracts are often contracts of adhesion because the contract is drafted by the 
dominant party and given to the weaker party on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis, with no opportunity to 
negotiate the contract’s terms.  See generally, WILCOX, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW ch. 90, § 
90.20 (2014). 
 41. Kenneth R. Davis, A Model For Arbitration: Autonomy, Cooperation and Curtailment of State 
Power, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167, 179 (1999). 
 42. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015). 
 43. Stephen L. Hayford, Jamie Darin Prenkert, & Anjanette H. Raymond, Employment Arbitration 
at the Crossroads: An Assessment and Call for Action, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 255, 256. 
 44. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 204 (1991) (quoting Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local 
No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1977)). 
 45. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’n Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986). 
 46. Comsti, supra note 35, at 23. 
 47. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 48. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 49. Linda D. Walton, All That Glitters Is Not Gold – Or the Problem of Unenforceable Agreements 
to Arbitrate Employment Claims, SL070 ALI-ABA 695 (March 2006). 
 50. Berkery v. Cross Country Bank, 256 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Penn. 2003) (quoting Pain-
eWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Riley Mfg. Co. v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 157 F.3d 775, 781 (10th Cir. 1999); see also 
Newmont U.S.A. Ltd. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 615 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that arbitra-
tion provisions are “presumed to survive the expiration of” the contract). 
 53. Id.  “Where the dispute is over a provision of the expired agreement, the presumption favoring 
arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clearly implication.”  Id. (quoting Nolde Bros., Inc. v. 
Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977)). 
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in the contract.
54
  The contracting parties’ intention as to the post-expiration effect 
of the arbitration provision is not established by silence.
55
 
C.  Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Effect of Arbitration Provi-
sions That Have Expired 
The post-expiration effect of arbitration provisions has been reviewed mostly 
in the context of collective bargaining agreements.
56
  Generally, an arbitration 
provision is presumed to survive the expiration of the contract unless the language 
expressly or implicitly states otherwise.
57
  The Supreme Court expressly addressed 
this issue in two key cases. 
In the first Supreme Court case, Nolde Brothers v. Bakery & Confectionery 
Workers Union,
58
 the issue before the Court was whether a party to a CBA con-
taining an arbitration clause was required to arbitrate contractual disputes regard-
ing severance pay after the termination of the agreement.
59
  Employer Nolde 
Brothers and the Union representing the bakery workers agreed in 1970 to a col-
lective bargaining agreement that stated “‘any grievance’ arising between the 
parties was subject to binding arbitration.”60  The agreement was to remain in 
effect until July 21, 1973, and until a new agreement was made or terminated by 
either party.
61
  Negotiations for a new CBA were unsuccessful, the Union termi-
nated the agreement, and the employer eventually closed the plant.
62
  The Union 
demanded severance pay as outlined under the prior agreement
63
 and submitted 
                                                          
 54. W. Liberty Foods, LLC v. Moroni Feed Co., 753 F.Supp. 2d 881, 888 (S.D. Iowa 2010). 
 55. Nolde Brothers, 430 U.S. at 253. 
 56. There are very few cases that discuss post-expiration effect of arbitration clauses when the 
contract is not a collective bargaining agreement.  See, e.g., Bolinger v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 293 
F.Supp. 2d 559 (D.V.I. 2003). 
 57. Riley Mfg. Co., 157 F.3d at 781. 
 58. Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at 255. 
 59. Id. at 244. 
 60. Id. at 245.  The contract provision says in part: 
GRIEVANCES AND ARBITRATION 
Section 1.  All grievances shall be first taken up between the Plant Management and the 
Shop Steward.  If these parties shall be unable to settle the grievance, then the 
Business Agent of the Union shall be called in, in an attempt to arrive at a set-
tlement of the grievance.  If these parties are unable to settle the grievance, the 
dispute will be settled as called for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Article. 
Section 2.   In the event that any grievance cannot be satisfactorily adjusted by the proce-
dure outlined above, either of the parties hereto may demand arbitration and 
shall give written notice to the other party of its desire to arbitrate . . . . 
Section 3.   The decision or award of the Arbitration Board, or a majority thereof, shall be 
final and binding on both parties . . . . 
Id. at 245 n.1. 
 61. Id. at 246 (the contract required that in the event no agreement was reached by July 21, 1973, the 
parties would continue to work under the previous CBA while negotiations continued for a new CBA). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 247.  The collective bargaining agreement says in part: 
 WAGES 
   Section 5. Each full-time employee who is permanently displaced from his employment with 
the Company by reason of the introduction of labor saving equipment, the closing of 
a department, the closing of an entire plant, or by lay off, shall be compensated for 
such displacement providing he has been actively employed by the Company for a 
period of at least three (3) years . . . . 
6
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the matter to arbitration.
64
  When the Nolde Brothers refused to submit to arbitra-
tion, the Union filed a motion to compel in the Eastern District Court of Virgin-
ia.
65
  The district court found that when the Union voluntarily terminated the CBA 
it destroyed any right to severance pay for the workers.
66
 
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found the district court should first determine if 
the parties’ duty to arbitrate the disputed issue “survived the expiration of the 
contract.”67  The court held the employer had a duty to arbitrate even after the 
contract terminated.
68
  Appealing to the Supreme Court, Nolde argued the duty to 
arbitrate must necessarily expire with the CBA that brought the duty into exist-
ence.
69
  Relying on precedent, the Court stated that the requirement to arbitrate 
contract disputes survived the expiration of a CBA.
70
  The Court held when “the 
dispute is over a provision of the expired agreement, the presumption favoring 
[arbitration] must be negated expressly or by clear implication.”71  Finding the 
duty to arbitrate was not “negated expressly or by clear implication,” the Court 
affirmed the appellate court’s requirement the dispute be resolved by arbitration.72  
In reaching the holding, the Court never reached the merits of the claim.
73
 
The second case to address post-expiration enforceability came in Litton Fi-
nancial Printing Division v. National Labor Relations Board.
74
  Litton is notable 
because the Court laid out the test for determining when a grievance falls within 
the scope of the CBA after its expiration.  Employer Litton Financial Printing 
refused to bargain with a newly-elected Union Board and refused to process layoff 
grievances.
75
  After administrative proceedings, the administrative law judge 
(ALJ) for the NLRB found that Litton had violated the NLRA
76
 because it failed 
to process the Union’s grievances.77  Nevertheless, on appeal, the panel for the 
NLRB did not order Litton to arbitrate the layoff grievances.
78
  At the Ninth Cir-
                                                          
Id. at 245 n.2. 
 64. Nolde Bros., 430 U.S. at 247. 
 65. Local No. 358, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int’l Union v. Nolde Brothers, Inc., 382 F. 
Supp. 1354 (E.D. Va. 1974). 
 66. Id. at 1358. 
 67. Local No 358, Bakery and Confectionery Workers Int’l Union v. Nolde Brothers, Inc., 530 F.2d 
548, 550 (4th Cir. 1975) (finding that the district court incorrectly and backwardly approached the 
issue by first determining whether the severance pay survived the contract). 
 68. Id. at 553. 
 69. Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 250 
(1977). 
 70. Id. at 251-52. 
 71. Id. at 255. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 249. 
 74. Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 197 (1991). 
 75. Id. at 194. 
 76. The NLRA, codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69, is a law passed in 1935 that provides the founda-
tion for the guarantee of basic rights for private sector employees to organize into unions and engage in 
collective bargaining activities.  See also Ramona Mariani, Case Brief, Issues in the Third Circuit: 
Labor Law – Post-Expiration Arbitability Under Collective Bargaining Agreement in the Third Cir-
cuit, Luden, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, 40 VILL. L. REV. 957 (1995). 
 77. Litton, 501 U.S. at 195. 
 78. NLRB v. Litton Fin. Printing Div., Inc., 893 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990).  The NLRB found 
the layoff grievance did not “arise under” the CBA because the layoffs occurred after the CBA ex-
pired; thus, the NLRB found Litton did not have to arbitrate the dispute because it had “no contractual 
obligation to arbitrate the grievances.”  286 N.L.R.B. 817, 821-22 (1987). 
7
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cuit, Litton argued the duty to arbitrate had expired with the contract.
79
  The Un-
ion argued the NLRB should have held the layoff grievances arose under the ex-
pired collective bargaining agreement and should be arbitrated because the obliga-
tion to arbitrate survives the CBA’s expiration.80  The Ninth Circuit held the 




Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court to address the issue of the 
arbitability of layoff grievances.
82
  The Court distinguished Litton by stating there 
might have been other issues that arise which although related to a contract term, 
do not have post expiration effect because the contract is no longer legally en-
forceable when it expires.
83
  It is because of this distinction the Court addressed 
the merits of Litton to determine if the right arose under the expired CBA.  Now 
known as the Litton test, a dispute falls within the scope of the contract where 1) 
“it involves facts and occurrences that arose before expiration, 2) where an action 
taken after expiration infringes a right that accrued or vested under the agreement, 
3) or where, under normal principles of contract interpretation, the disputed con-
tractual right survives expiration of the remainder of the agreement.”84  In creating 
these three requirements, the Court narrowed the Nolde Brothers finding that the 
“continued duty to arbitrate is binding only for disputes that either arose before 
the contract expired, or that concern ‘a right that accrued or vested under the 
agreement.’”85  Finding the layoff provision could not be said to create a right 
vested or accrued during the agreement, the Court held the duty to arbitrate did 
not carry over after expiration.
86
 
Yet, when the Third Circuit was faced with the issue of post expiration effect, 
it took a different approach in Luden’s, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, 
Confectionary, and Tobacco Workers’ International Union of America.87  In 1988, 
Tobacco Worker’s International Union of America (Tobacco Workers) and 
Luden’s had a three-year CBA.88  After negotiations for a new agreement broke 
down in 1991, the Tobacco Workers invoked the grievance procedure of the 1988 
agreement to address an issue involving the retroactivity of wages.
89
 
Under Nolde Brothers, the arbitability of a grievance depends on whether that 
issue arose under the contract; here, the Tobacco Workers argued that the wage 
issue was vested under the 1988 agreement and that CBA required the matter be 
submitted to arbitration.
90
  Luden’s filed suit against the Union for an injunction to 
prevent going to arbitration.
91
  Applying the Litton test which allows a court to 
review the merits of the claim, the district court found the retroactive wage dispute 
                                                          
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 1138-39. 
 82. Litton, 501 U.S. at 197-98. 
 83. Id. at 206. 
 84. Id. at 192. 
 85. Linda Greenhouse, Court Narrows Arbitration Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 1991), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/14/us/court-narrows-arbitration-precedent.html. 
 86. Litton, 501 U.S. at 210. 
 87. Luden’s Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int’l Un-
ion, 28 F.3d 347 (3rd Cir. 1994); see also Mariani, supra note 76. 
 88. Id. at 349-50. 
 89. Id. at 349. 
 90. Id. at 350-51. 
 91. Id. at 349. 
8
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did not arise under the agreement.
92
  The court held that Luden’s did not have to 
submit the dispute to arbitration.
93
 
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the Union challenged the district court’s in-
junction preventing arbitration.
94
  Reviewing the Supreme Court cases on the en-
forceability of arbitration provisions, the Third Circuit determined that Litton was 
at odds with Nolde.
95
  The appellate court noted that while Nolde suggested the 
court should not address the merits of the underlying claim, Litton held that the 
court has a “duty to reach the merits of a claim” when the issue in dispute has not 
“vested”96 and can only compel arbitration if the expired agreement “in fact cre-
ates the right or obligation at issue.”97  Nolde cast a wide net on what disputes 
must be resolved through arbitration, including any post-expiration grievances, 
depending on how the contract was interpreted.
98
  On the other hand, Litton signif-
icantly narrowed the types of disputes that must be arbitrated if the grievance 
arises after the contract has expired.
99
 
To address this conflict, the Third Circuit approached the issue from a differ-
ent angle and found an implied-in-fact agreement may exist between parties after 
the lapse of the contract if parties continue to perform their duties after the expira-
tion of the contract.
100
  An implied-in-fact CBA would contain the same provi-
sions as the expired contract.
101
  By taking this approach, the Third Circuit was 
able to avoid the merits of the case (the Nolde and Litton contradictions) and to 
decide if the arbitration clause should be given effect.
102
  Looking at the facts, the 
court concluded the parties continued to perform after the agreement expired as if 
there was an agreement.
103
  Consequently, the Third Circuit held that after the 
termination, Luden’s had a surviving duty to arbitrate the CBA because there was 
an implied-in-fact contract,
104
 and arbitration was required.
105
 
D.  Availability of Class Arbitration When the Agreement Is Silent 
While silence is golden in a movie theater, when an arbitration provision is si-
lent regarding whether or not class arbitration is permitted, courts have come up 
                                                          
 92. Luden’s Inc. v.  Local No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int’l Union, 805 
F. Supp. 313, 326-27 (E.D. Penn. 1992). 
 93. Luden’s Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int’l Un-
ion, 28 F.3d 347, 353 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
 94. Id. at 349. 
 95. Id. at 353. 
 96. Mariani, supra note 76, at 972-73. 
 97. Luden’s, 28 F.3d at 353. 
 98. Mariani, supra note 76, at 972. 
 99. Id. at 973-74. 
 100. Luden’s, 28 F.3d at 364.  The court looked to “general principles of contract law” and declared 
that “when a contract lapses but the parties to the contract continue to act as if they were performing 
under a contract, the material terms of the prior contract will survive intact unless either party clearly 
and manifestly” indicated they no longer wished to be bound by the contract’s terms.  Id. at 355. 
 101. Id. at 355-56. 
 102. Mariani, supra note 76, at 975. 
 103. Luden’s, 28 F.3d at 350 (when a new CBA was not finalized before the deadline, the parties had 
agreed to “continue operating under the terms of the current contract”). 
 104. Id. at 349. 
 105. Id. 
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with rules to fill the void.
106
  When employee are allowed to proceed as a class 
against their employer to arbitrate a dispute, the employees are able to share the 
benefits of class actions, such as accelerated proceedings, shared costs, informal 
discovery, confidentiality, and a more informal setting.
107
 
The Supreme Court has held the question of class arbitration is dependent on 
the language of the contract.
108
  The Court addressed whether class arbitration 
could go forward when the agreement was otherwise silent in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International Corp.
109
  According to the Court, under the FAA, a 
party is not required to submit to class arbitration if the parties did not agree to do 
so.
110




The issue of whether a group of individuals may arbitrate a dispute as a class 
is a “gateway matter” for courts to decide.112  So when an arbitration provision is 
silent as to class arbitration, then the court decides whether class arbitration is 
permitted.
113
  If class arbitration is not mentioned anywhere in the agreement, the 
Sixth Circuit has found classwide arbitration is not authorized.
114
 
E.  Comparing Arbitration Agreements in CBAs to Arbitration Agreements in 
Employment Contracts 
The Supreme Court held in Metropolitan Edison Company v. NLRB that a un-
ion could waive a statutory protection only if the waiver was explicitly stated and 
“clear and unmistakable.”115  The Court expanded this holding in Wright v. Uni-
versal Maritime Service Corporation, and found a CBA may waive the right to a 
judicial forum when the issue is employment discrimination, but again, it must be 
explicit and clear.
116
  Wright does not address waiver of individually negotiated 
rights in the employment context.
117
 
The Sixth Circuit addressed arbitration agreements in the individual employee 
context in Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak House, Inc.118  The Walker plaintiffs 
                                                          
 106. See Carole J. Buckner, Toward a Pure Arbitration Paradigm of Classwide Arbitration: Arbitral 
Power and Federal Preemption, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 301 (2004) (addressing how various courts have 
addressed the issue of class arbitration when the arbitration clause is silent). 
 107. Andrew Powell and Richard A. Bales, Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration, 2011 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 309. 
 108. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003). 
 109. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 110. Id. at 684. 
 111. Id. at 685 (the Supreme Court found class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration”); see 
also S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration?  Stolt-Nielson, AT&T, 
and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201 (2012) (a detailed analysis of how and 
if class arbitration changes the nature of arbitration). 
 112. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. 
LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013)). 
 113. Reed, 734 F.3d at 599.  See also Kevin Sack, Case Note, Plurality Influence: Reed Elsevier and 
the Precedential Value of Bazzle on Class Arbitrability, Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. 
Crockett, 2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 379, 381. 
 114. Huffman, 747 F.3d at 398-99 (citing Reed 734 F.3d at 599); see also Andrew Powell & Richard 
A. Blasé, Ethical Problems in Class Arbitration, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 309 (discussing the ethical 
issues connected with the decisions that prohibit of class arbitration). 
 115. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983). 
 116. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998). 
 117. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 118. Walker v. Ryan Family Steak House, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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were former employees of Ryan’s.  When hired by Ryan’s, they signed an arbitra-
tion agreement.
119
  The Ryan’s arbitration agreement was atypical because it was a 
contract between the employees themselves and Employment Dispute Services, 
Inc. (EDSI), a third-party dispute services company.
120
  Ryan’s contracted with 
EDSI to provide employment dispute resolution services between Ryan’s and its 
employees.
121
  Any disputes would be resolved by arbitration through EDSI and 
“not through litigation in state or federal court.”122 
The Walker plaintiffs filed suit against Ryan’s claiming they were not paid 
minimum wage or overtime, in violation of the FLSA.
123
  Ryan’s sought to en-
force the arbitration agreement the employees signed when they were hired.
124
  
The district court for the Middle District of Tennessee found the plaintiffs did not 
“knowingly and voluntarily” agree to arbitration and waive their right to a jury.125  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied five factors to determine if a party to a con-
tract had “knowingly and voluntarily” waived the right to a jury:  1) the party’s 
“experience, background, and education;” 2) the amount of time given to review 
the agreement and whether an attorney was consulted; 3) “the clarity of the waiv-
er;” 4) consideration; and 5) the totality of the situation.126  In holding the arbitra-
tion agreement was not enforceable, the Walker court gave substantial weight to 
the fifth factor, noting that EDSI was basically in the pocket of the employer and 
arbitration would not provide a fair and unbiased forum.  As a result, the Sixth 
Circuit found the employees did not knowingly and voluntarily waive their right 
to a jury trial.
127
 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in the union cased of Litton, Nolde Brothers, 
and Stolt-Nielson have shaped the path that individual employment contracts must 
navigate when the issue is related to the post expiration effect on the obligation to 
arbitrate grievances.  The Sixth Circuit has determined that class arbitration for 
individual employees is a threshold issue for the courts to decide.  However, the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Walker has complicated the post expiration effect of the 
obligation to arbitrate when the totality of the circumstances means that individual 
employees unknowingly waived a substantive right.  The instant case stepped onto 
the stage in this rocky arena. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
In Huffman v. Hilltop, the Sixth Circuit first reviewed whether the arbitration 
provision had any effect after the expiration of the contract.
128
  The court found 
“the need for an arbitration provision to have post-expiration effect is intuitive.”129  
                                                          
 119. Id. at 373 (rather than having employees sign an employment agreement, Ryan’s had its employ-
ees only sign an arbitration agreement). 
 120. Id. at 374. 
 121. Id. at 375. 
 122. Id. at 382 (emphasis deleted). 
 123. Id. at 373. 
 124. Walker, 400 F.3d at 373. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 381 (citing Morrison v.  Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir.  2003) (en 
banc) and quoting Adams v.  Philip Morris, Inc., 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir.  1995)). 
 127. Id. at 382. 
 128. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 394 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 129. Id. at 395. 
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Without an implied post-expiration effect, the requirement to arbitrate would ex-
pire with the contract and the party with a grievance would simply have to wait to 
sue until after the contract expired.
130
 
The Huffman court found the arbitration provision in the contract was broadly 
worded.
131
  Because broadly worded arbitration clauses place the burden on the 
plaintiff to rebut the federal preference for arbitration by showing clear implica-
tion of the parties’ intention, any doubts as to the parties’ intentions must usually 
be resolved in favor of arbitration.
132
 
The court rejected the argument for the application of contra proferentum—
rather all doubts relating to ambiguous contract language were “resolved in favor 
of arbitration.”133  When the court reviewed the whole document, nothing indicat-
ed the duty to arbitrate had expired with the contract.
134
  The court determined the 
survival clause was not intended to be an exhaustive list of clauses to survive ex-
piration, mainly because the non-compete clause was not enumerated in the sur-
vival clause and non-compete clauses by their very nature last until after the con-
tract has expired.
135
  The court thus found the survival clause “invites ambiguity 
as to which additional provisions the parties believed should survive expiration” 
of the employment contract.
136
 
The court also rejected the argument for application of expressio unius est ex-
clusion alterius because the survival clause was silent on many important contrac-
tual issues between the parties.
137
  For example, if the survival clause had listed 
twenty-three of the twenty-four contract provisions and simply did had not men-
tioned the arbitration clause, then there would be a clear implication the parties 
did not intend to arbitrate disputes post-expiration of the contract.
138
  Because that 
was not the case here and looking at the employment contract as a whole, the 
Sixth Circuit held the omission of the arbitration clause from the survival clause 
did not clearly imply the arbitration clause had no post-expiration effect.
139
 
Importantly, the Sixth Circuit did acknowledge the plaintiffs’ argument that 
they did not consent to arbitration knowingly or voluntarily because the arbitration 
provision was employer-drafted.
140
  The court stated the Sixth Circuit had rejected 
the requirement that an arbitration provision must have a statement that plainly 
waives the individual employee’s right to a jury trial.141  Rather, waiver must be 
explicitly stated only in a collective bargaining situation.
142
 
Regarding the issue of class arbitration, the Sixth Circuit looked to the lan-
guage of the arbitration clause itself.
143
  Citing a recent decision,
144
 courts are the 
                                                          
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (the arbitration provision stated “[a]ny Claim arising out of or relating to this agreement” will 
be submitted to arbitration). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 396-97. 
 134. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 397 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 135. Id. (the non-compete clause contained language stating it would remain in effect for twelve 
months after the expiration of the contract). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 398. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 141. Id. at 396 n.2. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 398. 
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decision makers who presumptively decide “the question of class arbitability.”145  
The court concluded since the employer-drafted arbitration provision was silent as 




V.  COMMENT 
Huffman is significant because it was the first time a circuit court was faced 
with determining the post-expiration effect of an arbitration provision in an indi-
vidual employment contract in light of the strong federal policy favoring enforc-
ing arbitration clauses.
147
  Finding the arbitration to be enforceable,
148
 the Sixth 
Circuit’s result maintained the nationwide trend to uphold arbitration clauses.149 
It is important to note in deciding Huffman, the Sixth Circuit followed the 
practice of applying the holdings from union arbitration cases to a situation of 
employer-drafted arbitration involving individual employees.  While union arbi-
tration cases can be looked to for guidance, courts must keep in mind that in the 
labor context, protection and fairness are built into the bargaining and agreement 
process, but those protections are missing when individuals are in situations where 
the employer drafted the arbitration provision.  Union arbitration in the labor con-
text is a key component of the employee and union relationship,
150
 the NLRB is 
authorized by Congress to enforce unions and employers to “engage in fair and 
equal bargaining,”151 and voluntary union arbitration is the method used to enforce 
the terms of the CBA.
152
  Voluntary union arbitration is premised on the idea that 
the grievance and arbitration process will be made available in exchange for un-
ions’ promise not to strike.153  Voluntary union arbitration thus creates a system of 
fairness and self-governance for both union workers and employer.
154
 
Courts routinely take holdings from voluntary union arbitration cases and ap-
ply the principles to situations of employer-drafted arbitration,
155
 but this raises 
problems for several reasons.  First, when parties are forced to arbitrate statutory 
rights, the arbitration process is not required to conform to the minimal standards 
of fairness found under the law;
156
 also, employees do not have the option to strike 
when the terms are unfair.
157
  Second, because the employer writes the terms and 
                                                          
 144. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 145. Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 146. Id. at 398-99. 
 147. Id. at 396. 
 148. Id. at 398. 
 149. While it appears in the Sixth Circuit poor contract drafting will be saved by the federal policy 
favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions, Huffman serves as a reminder to contract drafters 
that this is not always the case.  One takeaway is the importance of using express contract language.  
Contracts should clearly address the post-expiration effect of an arbitration provision.  Drafters should 
also review survival clauses to prevent disputes over the effect of contract provisions after the contract 
expires or terminates.  Furthermore, drafters should state whether or not class arbitration is permitted. 
 150. Comsti, supra note 35, at 19. 
 151. Id. at 20. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 20-21. 
 154. Id. at 21. 
 155. See, e.g., Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013) (an example of the Court 
applying precedent from a voluntary arbitration case to a forced arbitration situation). 
 156. Comsti, supra note 35, at 9. 
 157. Id. at 21. 
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procedures, often requiring employees to waive the right to bring class actions, the 
process is stacked against the employees.
158
  Third, research shows in employer-
drafted arbitration, employees “lose more often, win smaller awards, and spend 
more money” than if they had brought their claim in court.159  Finally, the secre-
tive and confidential nature of employer-drafted arbitration protects employers 
from public accountability and judicial review.
160
 
The Huffman plaintiffs’ employer-drafted arbitration issue is further distin-
guishable from the voluntary union cases the Sixth Circuit cited for several rea-
sons.  First of all, in union cases, neither party is seeking to go to court;
161
 but, in 
cases like Huffman, plaintiffs usually desire a judicial forum where the employer 
is seeking arbitration.  Second, in voluntary arbitration the union seeks to arbitrate 
on behalf of its members in order to enforce rights under a CBA,
162
 while individ-
ual employee plaintiffs seek to enforce their statutory rights under the FLSA and 
state law without the backing of a union.  Third, the union’s rights only exist be-
cause of the CBA,
163
 but the Huffman plaintiffs’ rights exist under federal statuto-
ry law.  Finally, in the context of a CBA, for the court to deny survival of the arbi-
tration provision is to deny the rights the CBA grants.  But when the Sixth Circuit 
found the arbitration provision in Huffman has post expiration effect, it under-
mined statutory workplace rights.
164
 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit did not adequately explore the Huffman plain-
tiffs’ concerns regarding the waiver of the right to a jury trial when there is an 
underlying statutory claim.
165
  Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak House166 is an ex-
ample where the Sixth Circuit found the arbitration provision in the employees’ 
individual employment contracts unenforceable because the plaintiffs
 
did not 
knowingly and voluntarily agree to arbitration.
167
  In the Huffman opinion, the 
Sixth Circuit downplayed the importance of the knowingly and voluntary standard 
which has been used by that court since 1995.
168
  Originally articulated in Adams 
v. Philip Morris, Inc.,
169
 it was later used in the en banc Sixth Circuit decision 
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.
170
  Additionally, Walker states the en banc 
decision in Morrison “clearly adopted the knowingly and voluntary standard for 
                                                          
 158. Id. at 9. 
 159. Id. at 9-10. 
 160. Id. at 10.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953), 
courts have incrementally limited the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards only when the 
arbitrator(s) exhibited “manifest disregard” of the law.  Id. at 16-17. 
 161. See generally, Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 196 (1991); and Nolde Bros., 
Inc. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255 (1977). 
 162. See generally, 1 EMP. & UNION MEMBER GUIDE TO LABOR LAW § 2:34, Westlaw (database 
updated May 2015). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See Comsti, supra note 35, at 7 (“forced arbitration has eroded the statutory purposes and protec-
tions of our nations workplace laws” like the FLSA). 
 165. The Huffman plaintiffs alleged Hilltop violated both the FLSA and the Ohio Minimum Fair 
Wage Standards Act.  Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 166. Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak House, Inc., 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 167. Id. at 383. 
 168. Id. at 381 (to determine if a party had “knowingly and voluntarily” waived their jury right, a 
court must review five factors:  (1) party’s “experience, background, and education;” (2) the time 
given to review the agreement and whether an attorney was consulted; (3) “the clarity of the waiver;” 
(4) consideration; and (5) the totality of the situation). 
 169. Adams v. Phillip Morris, 67 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 170. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 668 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
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agreements to arbitrate in lieu of litigation.”171  Thus, leaving it a mystery as to 
why the Sixth Circuit did not adopt the “knowingly and voluntary” standard for 
the Huffman plaintiffs. 
If the Sixth Circuit had applied the knowingly and voluntary standard to de-
termine if the Huffman plaintiffs had waived their right to a jury trial or bring 
their claims as a class, then it is possible the court would have determined the 
Huffman plaintiff’s fundamental rights were violated with the employer-drafted 
arbitration.  In situations of employer-drafted arbitration, the most careful analysis 
is necessary in order to ensure principles of fairness from the voluntary arbitration 
context are present as well. 
The Sixth Circuit’s determination that class arbitration must be explicitly 
permitted by the agreement meant the Huffman plaintiffs were unable to bring a 
FLSA collective action against their employer.  The Sixth Circuit should have 
used both Walker and Cooper v. MRM Investment Company
172
 to determine a 
fundamental right had been violated invalidating the arbitration provision.  Like 
the Cooper plaintiffs, each of the Huffman plaintiffs alleged a statutory FLSA 
claim against Hilltop, and should have been permitted to proceed as a class under 
the FLSA.
173
  Similarly to Walker, when the Huffman plaintiffs’ statutory rights 
are compromised, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates fundamental 
unfairness and consequently becomes a denial of a fundamental statutory right.  
The Sixth Circuit ought to have relied on these two cases to distinguish individual 
employer-drafted arbitration from voluntary union arbitration and held them to not 
be enforceable in situations such as Huffman.
174
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Let’s return to Sally and Billy, the new employees.  The post-expiration effect 
of arbitration provisions is an issue that impacts the substantive rights of individu-
al employees like Sally who agree to employer-drafted contracts.  As more em-
ployers are increasingly including arbitration provisions in individual employment 
situations, Sally’s fundamental statutory rights are restricted by these contracts.  
This situation is likely to affect more employees than in the past because union 
membership in the United States is declining,
175
 causing fewer workers to really 
have any sort of meaningful power to negotiate the arbitration agreements they are 
                                                          
 171. Walker, 400 F.3d at 381. 
 172. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2004).  It is also important to note that the 
underlying state law applicable in Cooper was Tennessee law, and the “knowingly and voluntarily” 
standard was based on Morrison, a case applying Ohio law.  Id. at 496; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 666.  
Moreover, the underlying state law in Huffman was Ohio law.  See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 666 (“In 
Morrison’s case, we apply the Ohio law of contract formation, as Morrison is employed by Circuit City 
in the state of Ohio . . . .”). 
 173. See Iliza Bershad, Note, Employing Arbitration: FLSA Collective Actions Post Concepcion, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 359 (2012) (arguing that FLSA plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed as a class 
because the right is protected under the FLSA, even if the arbitration provision is silent as to class 
arbitration). 
 174. Further, if the Huffman plaintiffs instead had been a union, then it is clear that the arbitration 
clause in a CBA would have had to explicitly state that the union and its members waived their right to 
a jury trial.  Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., 747 F.3d 391, 396 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 175. Drew Desilver, American Unions Membership Declines as Public Support Fluctuates, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. - FACTTANK (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/20/ 
for-american-unions-membership-trails-far-behind-public-support/. 
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entering.  These employment adhesion contracts are stripping away employee’s 
statutory protections in the workplace.  Courts should ensure an employee’s fun-
damental statutory rights are protected when reviewing the enforcement of em-
ployer-drafted arbitration. 
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